Income Contingent Loans for Drought Relief: Delivering better outcomes for farmers and taxpayers by Linda C. Botterill & Bruce Chapman
   
 
The Australian National University 






Income Contingent Loans for Drought Relief: 

























ISBN: 978 1 921262 75 3 
*  Director, National Institute for Rural and Regional Australia, The Australian National University. Email: 
Linda.Botterill@anu.edu.au; tel: (02) 6125 7664. 
**  Deputy Director, Crawford School of Economics and Government, College of Asian and the Pacific, The 
Australian National University. Email: Bruce.Chapman@anu.edu.au; tel: (02) 6125 4050. 
 
Acknowledgement: We dedicate this paper to the late Michael Egan, without whom this research could not have 
progressed effectively.  Michael’s depth of knowledge of farm financing and advice on how farm advisers might 
react to the introduction of an income contingent loan for drought relief was invaluable in informing the structure 
of the proposed scheme.  Without him, we would have an academic analysis, but from his input we believe we 





Australia’s National Drought Policy is considered to be one of the most advanced in 
the world, recognising as it does the reality of climate and focusing on adapting farm 
management to climatic uncertainty rather than simply subsidising agriculture in low 
rainfall areas.  But while the underlying principles of the Policy seem to be sound, 
after nearly two decades of implementation and incremental changes to the 
instruments applied under the policy have resulted in the loss of the risk management 
message, ongoing use of the exceptional circumstances provisions and growing 
inequities between farmers, and between farmers and non-farmers.  In this paper we 
argue that the objectives of the Policy need to be reaffirmed and key policy changes 
made to ensure the outcomes of the policy more closely align with its intentions.  We 
analyse financing policy issues and propose the introduction of an income contingent 
loan (ICL) for drought relief as an equitable and efficient policy instrument for 
delivering relief to farm businesses experiencing drought, and perhaps for other 
adverse circumstances.  It is argued that such a policy reform would allow farm 
businesses to take advantage of ICL insurance benefits associated with default 
protection and income smoothing, while at the same time minimising taxpayer 
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1 Introduction 
An early report on the state of agriculture and trade in New South Wales noted that 
the ‘uncertain climate’ of the colony was ‘not generally favourable to the growth of 
European grains’ (Bigge, 1966 [1823], p.18) and suggested that the future of 
agricultural production  
 
will be that of pasture rather than tillage, and the purchase of land will be 
made with a view to the maintenance of large flocks of fine-woolled sheep; 
the richer lands, which will generally be found on the banks of the rivers, 
being devoted to the production of corn, maize and vegetables (Bigge, 1966 
[1823], p.92) 
In spite of this advice, Australian agriculture developed beyond the confines of the 
river banks to become one of the most efficient and productive agricultural sectors in 
the world.  Australian farmers have an unenviable record of ongoing productivity 
improvement and have been highly innovative in adapting European farming practices 
to Australian conditions.  The uncertain climate of which Bigge wrote however, 
continues to cause hardship and the Bureau of Meteorology has reported that recent 
droughts have been accompanied by hotter temperatures (Hennessy et al., 2008, p.3) 
and the effects of climate change are likely to include a warmer and drier future for 
Australia (Hennessy et al., 2008, p.12).  This prognosis raises important policy 
questions about the provision of government drought relief: how it should be 
delivered, to whom, and how it should be financed. 
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This paper proposes the introduction of an income contingent loan (ICL) for drought 
relief as an equitable and efficient policy instrument for delivering relief to farm 
businesses experiencing drought, and perhaps for other adverse circumstances.  The 
article is set out as follow.  It begins with a brief history of Australia’s National 
Drought Policy, which was introduced in 1992 and is considered to be world’s best 
practice with its focus on risk management.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
shortcomings of the policy and the problems that have arisen with its implementation, 
including consideration of the 2008 policy review initiated by the Commonwealth 
government.  The third section of the paper contains our proposal for the introduction 
of an ICL as an effective and equitable way to deliver drought relief.  We outline the 
arguments for the use of this policy instrument, how it might be constructed to 
accommodate the features of farm financing, and how it might be combined with an 
existing program, Farm Management Deposits, to deliver an effective risk 
management tool for farmers across the climate cycle. 
 




Until 1989 drought was part of Australia’s natural disaster relief arrangements 
(NDRA), a standing Commonwealth-State agreement which sets out the funding 
responsibilities of the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments in the event 
of a natural disaster.  These arrangements are triggered by a State or Territory 
government’s declaration that a natural disaster has occurred, and provide a 3 
 
framework for the delivery of short-term aid to families and communities, support for 
the restoration of private assets and funding for the long term rebuilding of public 
assets and infrastructure.  In 1989 the Commonwealth government decided that 
drought was no longer to be included in the events covered by these arrangements.  
There were two key reasons for this decision.   
 
First, in many years, drought relief was dominating the NDRA Budget and there was 
suspicion that the program was being manipulated for political purposes by the 
Queensland government.  Second, scientific understanding of the drivers of 
Australia’s climate was improving with increasing knowledge of the influence of the 
El Niño-Southern Oscillation on drought conditions, particularly in the eastern states.  
This suggested that drought was not an unpredictable event of the nature of other 
natural disasters such as cyclones, bushfires or earthquakes; rather it was a normal 
part of the Australian climate.  Following the removal of drought from NRDA, the 
Commonwealth government set up a Drought Policy Review Task Force which 
reported in 1990 (DPRTF, 1990) recommending against the reinstatement of drought 
within the NDRA and suggesting that a National Drought Policy be developed based 
on principles of farmer self-reliance and risk management.  The report recognised that 
Australia’s climate is highly variable and that climate risk is one of a number of 
uncertainties to be managed by the farm business.   
 
The 1992 National Drought Policy was negotiated through the relevant 
Commonwealth-State ministerial council, the Agriculture Council of Australia and 
New Zealand (ACANZ), and was broadly consistent with the recommendations of the 
Review.  Ministers agreed that the policy would be ‘based on principles of sustainable 4 
 
development, risk management, productivity growth and structural adjustment in the 
farm sector’ (ACANZ, 1992, p.13).  The policy included an important caveat relating 
to ‘severe downturns’ during which support would be provided to ‘those with sound 
prospects who are temporarily in difficulty’ (ACANZ, 1992, p.13).  This response to 
severe events was given effect in the exceptional circumstances (EC) provisions of the 
Rural Adjustment Act 1992 which provided eligible farmers with interest rate 
subsidies of up to 100 percent on commercial borrowings.  A welfare component was 
introduced into the drought policy in 1994 in the form of the Drought Relief Payment 
(later the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment).  The Rural Adjustment 
Scheme was wound up in 1997 but both the interest rate subsidies and the welfare 
payment were retained for farmers experiencing exceptional circumstances. 
 
The EC provisions were triggered almost immediately that the Rural Adjustment Act 
1992 came into effect in January 1993; ironically for excessive rain in South Australia 
and Victoria.  They were also triggered the same year following a collapse in wool 
prices, and to support farmers affected by worsening drought in the eastern states.  
Since that time there have been EC declarations in place almost constantly, with some 
areas experiencing multiple years of declarations and, therefore, government 
assistance.  The conditions under which EC declarations have been made have not 
been consistent and it is arguable that some areas that have been receiving support 
have not been experiencing rainfall deficits of an ‘exceptional’ nature; rather they 
have experienced the normal variability of the Australian climate.  For a more detailed 




Forms of government support 
 
One of the difficulties associated with the delivery of assistance to farm businesses is 
the ‘unity of business and household’ (Mauldon and Schapper, 1974, p.65) that 
comprises the family farm.  The problem this poses for policy makers is ensuring 
farm welfare needs are met in way that does not provide a de facto subsidy for an 
otherwise unviable business.  Similarly there has been concern that linking farm 
welfare support to business objectives is inappropriate and inequitable.  A review of 
the Rural Adjustment Scheme in 1997 pointed to the problem of linking welfare and 
business support when it argued that ‘Welfare assistance should not be delivered 
through instruments that assist businesses.  Such an approach confuses the objective 
of the intervention, does not effectively target the welfare problem and distorts market 
signals to farm businesses receiving assistance’ (McColl et al., 1997, p.38).  The 
current drought policy nominally separates the two areas of support but there remain 
equity problems associated with linking welfare payments to the declaration of an EC 
drought. 
 
Under the 1992 policy, the main mechanism for supporting drought-affected farm 
businesses was an interest rate subsidy, i.e. a grant in the form of a subsidy on the 
interest paid on commercial finance.  Interest rate subsidies have been available in 
Australia as part of rural adjustment programs for decades, in spite of a number of 
reviews suggesting that they are an ineffective and inequitable means for delivering 
support (for example McColl et al., 1997, Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd, 1992, 
Freebairn, 1983).  Interest rate subsidies can result in substantial transfers of public 
money to individual farmers.  The current guidelines allow for payments to an 6 
 
individual farm business of up to $100,000 per year or $500,000 over five years, 
although it is unlikely that many farmers are in receipt of such large payments.   
Interest rate subsidies are only available to farmers who ‘are considered profitable in 
the long term but who, due to EC, are experiencing financial difficulties and are in 
need of assistance to achieve long-term profitability and sustainability’ (Department 
of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, 2008, p.17).  Freebairn has suggested that, 
drought interest rate subsidies ‘[encourage] lenders to substitute higher interest 
charges for less expenditure on loan assessment and management advice’ (Freebairn, 
1983, p.193).  Interest rate subsidies also have potential to be regressive as larger 
farms with higher incomes and more debt attract greater subsidies. 
 
In addition to the interest rate subsidy program, farm businesses have access to a 
tax-effective income smoothing instrument, Farm Management Deposits (FMDs).   
FMDs were developed as part of the National Drought Policy to encourage farmers to 
build cash reserves during high income years on which they could draw during 
downturns.  They were seen as an important risk management tool.  However, in 
recent years FMDs have been exempted from eligibility criteria for EC support – in 
other words farmers holding substantial reserves of cash in these deposits have been 
eligible for both interest rate subsidies and welfare payments without first drawing 
down their cash reserves.  This effectively undermines the purpose of the program as 
a cash flow management tool and is contrary to the principle applying to other forms 
of government support which generally require that recipients exhaust their own 
reserves before drawing on the public purse  
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The second component of the EC drought relief is a welfare payment, the Exceptional 
Circumstances Relief Payment.  The welfare component of the drought program was 
introduced in 1994 following reports of welfare problems in many drought affected 
areas, and was set up to provide farmers in EC areas with access to welfare payments 
on an equivalent basis to other groups in the community.  The major exception was 
the exclusion of farm assets from the assets test for the new payment.  Otherwise, the 
payment was offered on the same terms as the unemployment benefit.   
 
Importantly, this payment was not dependent on the prospects of the farm business.  
Where the interest rate subsidies were only accessible by farm businesses with a long 
term sustainable future in agriculture, the welfare payment was available to all 
eligible farmers in an EC area.  This raised concerns about inequities between those in 
difficulty inside the EC areas and those suffering income stress who had not been 
declared to be experiencing EC.  The introduction of the welfare payment also made 
the achievement of an EC declaration considerably more attractive as all eligible 
farmers in a declared area could access the support, irrespective of the health of their 
farm businesses.   
 
In 2005 the Commonwealth government announced changes to the eligibility criteria 
the effect of which was to allow farmers in receipt of an EC welfare payment to earn 
two and a half times as much per fortnight as a recipient of other forms of welfare 
(Botterill, 2006).  This gap was widened significantly in September 2007, when the 
income test was further relaxed (Howard, 2007); resulting in a $20,000 gap between 
the exempt earnings of farmers and those of other welfare recipients.  This change 
was justified by the then Minister on the grounds that ‘Given the length and severity 8 
 
of the drought, we now link off-farm income to the farm business itself. After all, 
these farm businesses are earning no income themselves, and yet they've got costs 
such as fixed water charges, local government rates, or lease payments on machinery 
or the like’ (ABC Radio, 2007).  In essence, this means the original intention that 
drought policy should only support those with a long-term sustainable future in 
farming had been abandoned, and the welfare system was being used to subsidise 
farm business operations, confusing the risk management message of the National 
Drought Policy. 
 
Farm poverty has not been measured systematically in Australia since the Henderson 
Inquiry of the 1970s.  The EC Relief Payment and related programs have been based 
on assumptions about the existence of farm poverty, its nature and causes.  In essence, 
the key assumption is that farm poverty is the result of sub-optimal levels of structural 
adjustment in agriculture.  Accordingly, programs have been developed to facilitate 
structural adjustment, including easing poorer farmers out of agriculture through 
income support measures tied to exit grants.  There is a clear need for an inquiry into 
farm poverty to determine the nature and extent of the problem and to develop 
appropriate programs which respond to the welfare needs of poor farm families in a 




There were two key problems with the delivery of drought relief in the period prior to 
the 2008 review.  First, EC declarations are based on geographical boundaries that 
bear little relationship to biophysical or climatic regions.  Declarations are made on 9 
 
the basis of administrative boundaries, for example the old Rural Lands Protection 
Board districts in NSW.  The inequities arising from defining drought on the basis of 
these largely arbitrary boundaries has become known as the ‘lines on maps’ problem 
and attempts have been made to address it through the creation of ‘buffer zones’ 
within the vicinity of declared areas.  While support is based on geographical regions, 
governments will face difficulties in defining EC in a manner which is scientifically 
justifiable across time and space.  A drought in east Gippsland is different in nature 
from one on the edge of the arid zone, which is different again from a drought in north 
Queensland or the Pilbara.   
 
In addition, separating drought conditions from other agricultural factors is difficult.  
As Heathcote observed, ‘the same rainfall which gave a bonanza wheat crop […] in 
the 1880s, would be classed as a drought in the 1980s’ (Heathcote, 1994, p.100).  
Developing a definition which is meaningful in terms of temporal and spatial 
difference, and which is consistent with an underlying principle of understanding and 
living with the challenges of the Australian climate, is highly problematic.  The 
international water resources literature confirms the challenges of defining drought 
(see for example Dracup et al., 1980, Wilhite, 2000, Wilhite and Glantz, 1985).   
Further differentiating between ‘normal’ and ‘exceptional’ drought compounds the 
problem.   
 
In policy terms, the existence of the EC provisions has set up perverse incentives for 
farmers experiencing a drying spell.  Where the National Drought Policy was focused 
on managing dry periods as part of normal climate cycles, the existence of the EC 
program provides an incentive for farmers and their representatives to make the case 10 
 
that they are experiencing particularly bad conditions as this provides access to 
interest rate subsidies and welfare payments.  This has reinforced the perception that 
drought is a natural disaster, a concept that was rejected in policy terms with the 
removal of drought from the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements in 1989. 
 
As the Drought Policy Review Task Force recognised in 1990, variability is the norm 
for the Australian climate and a sensible drought policy will recognise that reality and 
develop programs that support farmers in the transition from a disaster response to 
risk management.  The ideal policy would arguably be to end the declarations of 
exceptional circumstances drought altogether and have standing support arrangements 
for farm businesses and farm families based on individual need.  In fact, the 
Productivity Commission (2008) recommended the ending of declarations in it draft 
report into drought support, as discussed below.  
 
The second major issue with the drought response as it evolved between 1992 and 
2008 relates to question of equity in the delivery of support to both farm businesses 
and farm families.  Inequities arose between farmers, and between farmers and 
non-farmers.  With respect to business support, interest rates subsidies only provide 
relief to farmers with debt or who are prepared to take on debt.  For some farm 
businesses, this may constitute poor risk management, since farmers without debt who 
are unprepared to take on debt are excluded from support.  As well, the magnitude of 
the interest rate subsidies is very likely to be regressive.  Farmers often have 
substantial assets and over their life times are likely to be wealthier than the average 
taxpayer funding the grants.  The rationale for providing interest rate subsidies was 
that market failure was occurring in the delivery of commercial finance to drought-11 
 
affect farmers who were in temporary difficulty but were viable over the long term.  
There is little evidence of the existence of this form of market failure. 
 
With respect to the welfare payment, the linking of eligibility to an EC declaration is 
inequitable and is also inconsistent with the principles underpinning other forms of 
welfare available to the Australian community.  The unemployment benefit is not 
only available to job seekers in suburbs with high unemployment – eligibility is based 
on personal circumstances and need.  This should also be the case for farm welfare 
payments.  At present, there is potential for farmers in genuine welfare need to be 
excluded from receiving government support because they are not in an area declared 
to be experiencing EC drought. 
 
The 2008 Policy Review 
 
In 2008, the Commonwealth government announced  a review of Australia’s National 
Drought Policy.  The review comprised three related reports: a climate review 
undertaken by the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, a review of the social impact 
of drought by an expert panel, and a review by the Productivity Commission which 
was tasked with reporting on the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of 
existing drought relief programs.  This is the first comprehensive review of the 
National Drought Policy since it was agreed by Commonwealth and State Ministers 
for Agriculture in July 1992.  For the purpose of this paper, we are focusing on the 
PC’s inquiry, although it is clear that the results of all three inquiries will inform the 
development of government policy (Burke, 2008).  In summary, the PC’s major 
recommendations of relevance to this discussion are: 12 
 
•  The two existing EC programs, the interest rate subsidies and the welfare 
payments, be terminated ‘with the last year of eligibility for those in EC areas 
being 2009-10’; 
•  Government programs be adjusted to support farmers in adapting to climate 
variability and climate change,  and to encourage self reliance and risk 
management; 
•  Temporary income support be available which recognised ‘the special 
circumstances of farmers’, and that such support not be limited to farmers 
whose low incomes result from drought conditions; 
•  The Farm Management Deposits scheme should be retained; and 
•  EC declarations be terminated (Productivity Commission, 2008, pp. xlvii-xlix) 
 
The principles underpinning the National Drought Policy remain sound.  What is 
needed following the current review is a restatement of the self-reliance and risk 
management messages of the original policy and the development of programs that 
assist in achieving these objectives.  Experience with the implementation of the 
National Drought Policy since it commenced on 1 January 1993 suggests the need for 
a major rethink of the programs of support on offer.  While the underlying principle of 
climate as a risk of the farm business to be managed remains sound, the evolution of 
the policy has undermined that objective and turned the policy into little more than a 
subsidy program for Australian farmers.   
 
It has been argued that there is no case for government involvement in drought relief 
on economic grounds (see, for example Freebairn, 1983).  If climate variability is a 13 
 
business risk, it can be managed like any other risk.  However, drought relief is not 
just an economic issue – there is a powerful political dimension as well.  Leaving 
drought-affected farmers to manage without government support is politically 
unviable in a country which still regards farmers as an important part of its national 
identity (Botterill, 2006).  As Heathcote has noted, ‘In any catastrophe, public 
sympathy goes out to the victims, but when those victims are the sons of the soil, on 
the margins of the good earth, struggling to give us our daily bread, the emotional 
response is tremendous and objectivity is often left behind’ (Heathcote, 1973, p.36).  
Given that governments will continue to want to respond when there is worsening 
drought, the challenge is to develop a policy response that is more equitable and 
effective than current arrangements.  Removing farm welfare from drought relief can 
be seen to be a good start.  In the area of farm business support, a combination of 
FMD and ICL is now discussed. 
 
3  A Better Policy Approach Through Income Contingent Loans 
 
In our submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry (Botterill and Chapman, 
2008) we advocated the introduction of an ICL as a replacement for interest rate 
subsidies and as a complement to the existing FMD scheme.  The PC’s Draft Report 
argued that ‘the Commission is not convinced that there is a strong rationale for 
governments to provide ICLs to farmers’.  It did not provide strong justification for 
this conclusion beyond referent to the submission by the Australian Bankers’ 
Association that there was no failure of credit markets for drought-affected farmers.  
(Productivity Commission, 2008, p.180), an analysis with which we tend to disagree.  14 
 
It is arguable that there are special circumstances in farm financing that warrant 
government intervention but that that intervention should be structured in a manner 
that provides income smoothing and default protection without being particularly 
burdensome on taxpayers.  ICLs satisfy these criteria. 
 
Identifying and Addressing “Market Failure”: The Advantages of Income Contingent 
Loans for Farming  
 
ICL have two important features which make them particularly well suited to the 
needs of farmers faced with fluctuating incomes; namely they provide default 
protection for the farmer and they are an income smoothing mechanism.  These 
benefits are considered in turn, in the context of the financing of rural business 
activity. 
 
It is sometimes argued that a so-called “market failure” does not exist for farm 
financing if it is the case that banks are generally willing to lend to farm businesses 
(Australian Bankers' Association, 2008). However, this analysis only addresses the 
supply side of credit provision and there is a case that there is a significant access 
issue on the demand side of this potential credit activity. This is that there seems to be 
compelling evidence of farmers’ reluctance to take on high levels of credit. In the 
Productivity Commission’s Draft Report for the Inquiry into Government Drought 
Support, 2008, evidence is offered concerning the experience of financial hardship in 
the farming sector, and this is now considered. 
 15 
 
In a survey conducted in 2007 of regional and rural families by the Australian 
Institute of Family Studies respondents were asked to record whether or not they were 
experiencing financial hardship, and the results for farmers show that 45 percent in a 
drought area believed that they were. Indeed, even 35 percent of farmers living in an 
area of above average rainfall categorising themselves in the same way (Productivity 
Commission, 2008, p.57). The critical question arises, if the banks are willing to lend 
to farmers in times of hardship, why is it apparently the case that the farmers 
themselves are unwilling to take advantage of this available credit? 
 
One potentially compelling reason is that a key problem with farm financing is that 
farmers are likely to value their farms far more highly than the dollar value placed on 
the property by the finance sector due to the level of ‘psychic income’ associated with 
farming as an occupation (Vincent, 1976, p.111).and the psychic losses associated 
with losing the family farm.  In addition, individual risk perception discounts upside 
risk and overestimates downside risk (Margolis, 1996, p.93), which means that 
farmers will borrow less than the finance sector is willing to provide because of their 
high level of concern with the possible loss of the farm, which may have been in the 
family for generations. This promotes for consideration the very important issue of 
default risk, and it is completely consistent with the above-noted evidence. It implies 
that there is a form of “credit failure” that cannot be resolved with normal bank loans, 
since loans of this form cannot offer insurance against default, and thus cannot 
provide insurance against the potential for the loss of the property. ICL, because the 
repayments are based on capacity to pay, provide this type of insurance. 
 16 
 
The second advantage of ICL is their income smoothing effect.  This has two 
elements, both related to capacity to pay.  First, and noting that ICLs can be seen to be 
a mirror image of FMDs, they effectively allow farmers to borrow from future good 
years to improve their financial position in contemporary poor circumstances. Second, 
as with all ICLs, only very small repayments are required in low income years, but 
these can increase significantly in years of high farm incomes.  By contrast, a standard 
mortgage-style bank loan can usually require a fixed repayment which in low income 
years can amount to a very high proportion of the farm’s income, potentially causing 
considerable hardship.  It should be noted that the banks have shown some flexibility 
in their dealings with drought-affected farmers which would have some degree of 
income-smoothing effect (Australian Bankers' Association, 2008, p.3).However, this 
flexibility remains based on commercial imperatives and lacks the certainty that an 
ICL can offer. 
 
An understanding of farming credit problems in the above contexts offers a different 
perspective on the role of ICL as a supplementary financing instrument for times of 
rural hardship. This is because, unlike any other form of credit, the collection of an 
ICL is defined by capacity to pay, and thus it is impossible to default on this form of 
debt due to poor circumstances, and they also offer income smoothing. This is in 
essence why ICL are potentially such a significant rural financing instrument.  As 
explained by Moss (2002), governments are in a unique position to provide insurance 
benefits of this type. 
 
Features of an ICL for drought relief 
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We have discussed the possible features of an ICL elsewhere (Botterill et al., 2004, 
Chapman et al., 2004, Botterill and Chapman, 2004, Botterill and Chapman, 2006) 
and the scheme has been modelled using ABARE data and testing different scenarios 
for collection of the loan as well as the impact on both government revenue and on the 
financial position of different groups of farmers (Kelly et al., 2004). 
 
Structuring an ICL scheme for farmers raises some particular challenges.  The unity 
of the farm family and the farm business discussed above and the array of tax 
deductions available for farmers raises the concern that farmers are tax minimisers 
and capable of ‘hiding’ income.  The consequence of this is that an ICL along the 
lines of HECS-HELP and FEE-HELP (previously known as HECS), which calculates 
repayment obligations on the basis of personal taxable income, would not work as 
farmers would either never trigger the repayment threshold or would underpay due to 
understatement of their actual income position.  Secondly, because the 
Commonwealth would have no claim over the farm asset, repayment of an ICL could 
be avoided through the sale of the farm, inheritance or changes to partnership 
arrangements.  Simply replicating existing ICL schemes such as HECS for drought 
relief is clearly not an option; the ICL would need to be structured specifically to 
recognise the nature of farm businesses. 
 
Although the Productivity Commission proposed, and we agree, that an improved 
National Drought Policy should end EC declarations, an ICL of the type outlined 
could be offered on the basis of existing EC declaration processes.  In the event that 
declarations are ended, it could be structured to respond to individual farm 
circumstances.  In administrative terms, the former would be quicker and easier to 18 
 
implement and could be seen as an interim program in a transition to the ending of 
declarations for the reasons outlined above. 
 
The collection of a drought relief ICL raises two main issues: the implementation of a 
threshold below which farmers are not required to repay and the repayment 
mechanism itself. 
 
It is suggested that a drought ICL not include a repayment-free threshold. This is 
because farm receipts reflect to an important extent farm size which means that if 
repayments were not required for revenue below a certain level the policy might 
excuse all repayments from small farm units (even in periods in which a significant 
proportion of small establishments are not experiencing economic hardship).  Having 
a revenue threshold for repayment would also have an unfortunate behavioural 
characteristic of systematically encouraging the participation in the scheme of those 
farms expecting to have relatively low gross revenue in the longer term, thus 
undermining the prospect for the government of high levels of collection. An ICL 
collected on the simple basis as a percentage of a measure of income would be the 
preferred arrangement. 
 
In order to ensure that the loan is repaid, it is proposed that the debt be collected on 
the basis of gross revenue rather than taxable income.  An important administrative 
issue is that gross revenue is already reported on the Business Activity Statement 
(BAS) which farm businesses complete for GST purposes.  But because gross revenue 
is a relatively crude measure of farm welfare, it is proposed that the repayment rate be 
set at a very low level.  In Kelly et al. (2004) we have modelled repayments at both 2 19 
 
percent and 5 per cent of gross revenue, and our simulations show that the associated  
revenue streams for the government appear to be satisfactory for these repayment 
parameters. 
 
In order to avoid the potential for farmers to circumvent repayment by holding an ICL 
against one ABN (Australian Business Number) and reporting their income against 
another, farm businesses with a drought ICL should be required to group their ABNs 
and report their activities on a single BAS.  Many farm businesses are already 
grouping their ABNs on the advice of their accountants. 
 
Attaching the ICL to an ABN has the further advantage of ensuring repayment should 
the ownership of the farm business be rearranged or changed entirely.  On the sale of 
the farm there would be a requirement for the ICL to be paid in full.  When a rural 
property is purchased, a number of searches are already undertaken – this would be 
extended to an ABN search to determine if there was an outstanding drought ICL on 
the property.  The purchaser could then require that the loan be paid out or agree to 
take it on for an associated reduction in the purchase price of the property. 
 
In the case of the death of the farmer the property is likely to either be sold, in which 
case the above scenario applies, or continue in operation in which case the ICL would 
continue to be paid out of the operations of the farm. Further, to insure against a 
different form of avoidance, we propose that the reconstitution of a partnership would 
require a new ABN in which case the ABNs of the former partnership would be 
required.  This would alert the ATO to the existence of an ICL. 
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A further possible concern relates to bankruptcies and what this would mean for an 
ICL scheme design. It is important to note that bankruptcies are a rare occurrence in 
the rural sector as banks monitor their clients’ financial positions and tend to 
encourage sale before bankruptcy occurs.  That monitoring process would take 
account of the existence of an ICL as one of the obligations of the farm business. 
 
Applying a real rate of interest to the ICL would further minimise the incentives for 
poorer operators to use the ICL scheme, as there would be no implicit subsidy that 
would benefit those who took longer to repay the loan, i.e. those with lower future 
revenue, over those who paid it off quickly.  A different form of a real interest rate 
would be to impose a surcharge on the debt, as happens currently with the FEE-HELP 
scheme. However, while this approach reduces taxpayer interest rate subsidies it does 
not have the benefit of reducing potential adverse selection. 
 
Advantages on an ICL-FMD combination for drought relief 
 
ICLs are consistent with the principles of the National Drought Policy and offer a 
clear alternative to interest rate subsidies.  ICLs mirror FMDs in that farmers 
essentially borrow from future good years rather than from past good performance.  
Income contingent loans could be combined with FMDs in a single farm business 
financial risk management program through which farmers draw down their FMDs 
and then have access to an ICL once their reserves are exhausted, possibly leaving a 
small amount of cash in the FMD for working capital.  This would also address one of 
the limitations of FMDs, which is that new entrants may not have time to accumulate 
reserves before they encounter a downturn. 21 
 
 
Any government support program is ultimately paid for with taxpayers’ money.   
Under the current guidelines for interest rate subsidies, an individual farm business 
can receive a grant of $100,000 or $500,000 over five years.  It is acknowledged that 
few, if any, farmers receive assistance of this magnitude, however the grants amount 
to substantial transfers between the taxpayer and the farmer.  One of the 
characteristics of farming is that farm families are often income-poor and asset-rich.  
This means that, although farmers are in short term difficulty during drought, over 
their lifetimes they are likely to be wealthier than the average taxpayer who funds 
their drought relief. A properly designed ICLs would not have this regressive 
property. 
 
It is important to note that both ICLs and FMDs have the effect of ‘consumption 
(income) smoothing’.  FMDs are accumulated during high income years and reserves 
are built up to be drawn down in low income years.  Similarly, because an ICL is 
repaid on the basis of capacity to pay, repayments are sensitive to the farm’s financial 
situation and avoid the problem of mortgage-type loans which are constant 
irrespective of the borrower’s capacity to pay.  Thus an ICL can be seen to protect 
borrowers against the financial hardships associated with normal borrowings. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Australia’s National Drought Policy is considered to be one of the most advanced in 
the world, recognising as it does the reality of climate and focusing on adapting farm 
management to climatic uncertainty rather than simply subsidising agriculture in low 22 
 
rainfall areas.  The underlying principles of the Policy seem to be sound.  However, 
nearly two decades of implementation and incremental changes to the instruments 
applied under the policy have resulted in the loss of the risk management message, 
ongoing use of the EC provisions and growing inequities between farmers, and 
between farmers and non-farmers.  This paper argues that the objectives of the Policy 
need to be reaffirmed and key policy changes made to ensure the outcomes of the 
policy more closely align with its intentions.   
 
Our analysis is consistent with the recommendation in the Productivity Commission’s 
Draft report that interest rate subsidies should be abolished.  We suggest that they be 
replaced with a Farm Risk Management Program that combines FMDs with ICL, a 
combination which would provide farm managers with mechanisms for managing 
their cash flow across the climate cycle.  Ultimately this business support package 
could be made available on an individual farm basis, ending all need for EC 
declarations.   
 
At the time of writing the Productivity Commission had not released its final report.  
We hope that the Commonwealth government takes the opportunity of the review 
process renew the policy and refocus it on its original goal of supporting farmers in 
living with the reality of the Australian climate.  An important part of such a policy 
renewal would be the introduction of an ICL for drought relief. This would allow 
farm businesses to take advantage of the insurance benefits associated with default 
protection and income smoothing, while at the same time minimising taxpayer 
contributions to drought relief. 23 
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